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PRIVACY AND SECURITY OF DATA
Judith Beth Prowda*
INTRODUcTION
The right to privacy was defined more than a century ago by Judge
Thomas M. Cooley as the right "to be let alone."2 10 In an oft-cited
law review article written in that era, Samuel D. Warren and Louis D.
Brandeis concluded that the right to privacy was based on a broader
principle and claimed that the growing excesses of the press justified a
remedy based on the infliction of mental distress upon private individ-
uals."1' Following this seminal piece, so many authors have written on
the right to privacy that scholars on the subject have remarked that
"no other tort has received such an outpouring of comment in advo-
cacy of its bare existence. 212
The right to privacy213 is not expressly granted in the U.S. Constitu-
tion. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has interpreted the Constitu-
tion to grant to individuals the right to privacy, based on the First
Amendment's freedoms of expression and association, 1 4 the Fourth
Amendment's protection of persons, places, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizure, 15 the Fifth Amendment's
privilege against self-incrimination and requirement of due process, 16
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(M.A., French Language and Literature), The Johns Hopkins University School of
Advanced International Studies (M.A., International Relations), Fordham University
School of Law (J.D.), New York University School of Law (L.L.M., Trade Regula-
tion). The author wishes to thank Professor Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, New York
University School of Law, and Professor Joel R. Reidenberg, Fordham University
School of Law, for their valuable comments to earlier drafts of this section of the
Report.
210. Thomas M. Cooley, The Law of Torts 29 (2d ed. 1888).
211. See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. L.
Rev. 193, 213-14 (1890).
212. W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 117, at 850
(5th ed. 1984).
213. This section of the Report addresses the right to privacy, or the right of indi-
viduals to control information held by others, not privacy in the context of Supreme
Court decisions pertaining to abortion or other personal behavior of individuals. The
right to privacy, as used in this section, refers to "the claim of individuals, groups, or
institutions to determine for themselves when, how, and to what extent information
about them is communicated to others." Alan F. Westin, Privacy and Freedom 7
(1967).
214. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564-66 (1969); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel.
Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460-63 (1958).
215. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350-53 (1967) (establishing protection of
persons under the Fourth Amendment); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478
(Brandeis, J., dissenting) (1928); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 627-30 (1886).
216. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656-57 (1961) (noting that an unconstitutional
seizure is tantamount to coerced self-incrimination).
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penumbras of the Bill of Rights2 17 and the Ninth Amendment,21 and
the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of ordered liberty219 Indeed,
as one privacy scholar observed, the right to privacy "has almost as
many meanings as Hydra had heads."" 0 Certain privacy rights cases
decided by the Supreme Court focus on the right of individuals to
control their lives through highly personal decisions. 2 The common
thread in these cases is "that each citizen has a right of autonomy-a
right to decide how to live and to associate with others, free from all
but the most carefully limited impingements by governmental
authority."tM
At least ten states have constitutions that expressly define personal
privacy as a protected and fundamental right.t m Numerous federal
and state statutes also protect individuals from governmental misuse
of personal information2 24 A few specialized federal statutes adopt
fair information principles for specific industries in the private sec-
tor?2 As a practical matter, however, beyond Fourth Amendment
search and seizure standards, few restrictions on personal data collec-
tion are imposed."
217. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-85 (1965).
218. Id. at 488-91 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
219. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973).
220. Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, False Light Invasion of Privacy: The Light That
Failed, 64 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 364, 364 (1989). For a recent discussion of constitutional
privacy, see Ellen Alderman & Caroline Kennedy, The Right to Privacy (1995).
221. See e.g., Roe, 410 U.S. at 152-53 (discussing a woman's right to abortion);
Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485 (1965) (discussing the right of married persons to use
contraceptives).
222. Zimmerman, supra note 220, at 364.
223. Raymond T. Nimner, The Law of Computer Technology 16.08121 (2d ed.
1992); see, e.g., Ariz. Const. art. II, § 8 ("No person shall be disturbed in his private
affairs, or his home invaded, without authority of law."); Cal. Coast. art. I, § 1 (includ-
ing privacy in a list of inalienable rights).
224. For example, two federal statutes bar private parties or the government from
intercepting data. The Communications Act of 1934 prohibits any action to "intercept
any radio communication and divulge [such communication]." 47 U.S.C. § 605(a)
(1988). This law also applies to unauthorized access of an electronic database system.
Telerate Sys., Inc. v. Caro, 689 F. Supp. 221, 230-31 (S.D.N.Y. 1988). The Electronic
Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (the "ECPA") prohibits any unauthorized inter-
ception or disclosure of wire, oral, or electronic communications. 18 U.S.C. § 2511
(1994); see infra part II.F.3 (discussing the ECPA); infra part LA (discussing the Pri-
vacy Act of 1974).
All states agree that certain records should remain confidential. Bruce D. Gold-
stein, Comment, Confidentiality and Dissemination of Personal Information: An Ex-
amination of State Laws Governing Data Protection, 41 Emory LJ. 1185, 1185 (1992).
No two states, however, have adopted the same standards of confidentiality or proce-
dural safeguards. Id. Some states omit entire categories of information, such as crimi-
nal, health, and tax records, from their confidentiality provisions. Id. at 1185 & n3.
225. See infra part II. Most states have also enacted lawvs that apply to industry.
Joel R. Reidenberg, Privacy in the Information Economy: A Fortress or Frontier for
Individual Rights?, 44 Fed. Comm. LJ. 195, 227 & n.178 (1992).
226. Nimmer, supra note 223, 1 16.08[1]. In a landmark 1967 case, the Supreme
Court held that the right to privacy found in the Fourth Amendment protects individ-
1995]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
In recent years, the National Information Infrastructure ("NII"),227
popularly known as the information superhighway, has expanded so
rapidly that interactive technologies and integrated systems may even-
tually be widespread.2" Modem technology allows students and re-
searchers around the globe to browse through distant libraries and
collaborate with others, by using a television, camcorder, only or per-
sonal computer.2 9 In the near future, individuals may be able to join
in family events or participate in electronic town meetings via the
NII.23
0
Thousands of shoppers go online everyday for groceries, clothing,
furniture, art work, or even a new home. The Internet, a "dense
global matrix of 1.7 million computers,"23' links fifteen to thirty mil-
lion people in 137 countries and is steadily growing by a million users
per month.232 Commercial and noncommercial uses of the Internet
are reportedly on the rise, making it "the world's most fashionable
rendezvous. 12 33 In the private sector today, the dealing in personal
information on individuals is a profitable industry. With the bur-
geoning of computers in the past decade, it has become easier than
ever to build a detailed profile of an individual's behavior, political
and sexual preference, social networking, driving record, and health
status. This is done by simply gathering credit card data, telephone
calling patterns, and other information available electronically. 234
uals against warrantless wiretapping. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 359 (1967).
The Court established a standard for determining zones of privacy-whether the rea-
sonable expectation of privacy outweighs the government's interest in conducting a
search-based on the level of intrusion involved. See id. at 354-56. Thus, the Fourth
Amendment protects not only an individual's tangible property, but also the individ-
ual's thoughts, communications, personality, and politics. In later cases, however, the
Katz reasonable expectation of privacy standard was held not to be violated by cer-
tain intrusions because the circumstances of modern existence have diminished an
individual's expectation of privacy. See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190-
96 (1986) (upholding state anti-sodomy law as being rationally grounded in current
moral views of Georgia citizens); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442-43 (1976)
(noting lack of any legitimate expectation of privacy concerning banking records).
227. The NII refers to a "seamless interactive web of communications networks,
computers, data bases, and consumer electronics" that will put vast amounts of infor-
mation at the users' fingertips. Inquiry on Privacy Issues Relating to Private Sector
Use of Telecommunications-Related Personal Information, 59 Fed. Reg. 6842 (1994)
[hereinafter NTIA Notice of Inquiry].
228. Examples of interactive multimedia include participatory television, teleshop-
ping, telebanking, video on demand, interactive video games, videoconferencing, re-
mote medical testing and evaluation, and distance learning. Integrated digital
technology permits an instantaneous dialogue between the user and system. Some of
these technologies already exist and others exist in test stages. See id. at 6843-44.
229. Id. at 6844.
230. Id.
231. John Markoff, The Internet, N.Y. Tunes, Sept. 5, 1993, § 9, at 11.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. See Reidenberg, supra note 225, at 197-98. In fact, credit card data represents
only a small fraction of the information online, claims attorney Janlori Goldman of
[Vol. 64
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According to some reports, over 10,000 lists of data about individu-
als are available for rent.3 s A recent estimate stated that the business
of selling personal information was three billion dollars per yearP16
The estimated amount of time an average American professional will
devote in a lifetime to sifting through direct mail solicitation is eight
monthsP 7 One author, who posed as a CEO of a fictional direct mail
corporation, discovered that 63.7 billion pieces of junk mail were sent
from the companies he studied -a
Brokers and commercial services can readily provide consumer lists
to the marketing industry, which boasts greater shopping convenience
and better service for consumers233 9 Apparently, many American
consumers agree. A spokesperson for Direct Marketing Association
reported that "direct marketing accounts for $350 billion in sales an-
nually, and 54% of adult Americans, or 111 million consumers, shop
this way."' 4
Some consumers, however, may feel trapped in the web of target
marketing.241 Inevitably, a certain number of these consumers may
also fall victim to computer error. While the exact number of errors is
in dispute, one credit bureau in the New York City area found errors
in 43% of their files.z 2 That rate, projected to the nation's 400 million
credit files, would mean that mistakes occur in roughly 172 million
credit reports. 43 The nature of some of these errors is relatively mi-
nor, such as an outdated address.2 " Other errors, such as those con-
fusing the credit information of two people with similar names, can
the ACLU's Privacy Project. Charles PUller, Privacy in Peril: How Computers are
Making Private Life a Thing of the Past, The Recorder, July 19, 1993, at 8. Public
records include information on real estate ownership, voter registration data, auto
and driver records, and marriage records. Id
235. Daniel Mendel-Black & Evelyn Richards, Peering Into Private Lives, Wash.
Post, Jan. 20, 1991, at H1, H6; Jill Smolowe, Read ThisLIL!!, Tune, Nov. 26. 1990, at
62, 66 (referring to Standard Rate and Data Service publication of Direct Mail List
Rate and Data, which describes over 10,000 commercially available lists); see also
Deborah L. Jacobs, They've Got Your Name. You've Got Their Junk, N.Y. Tunes,
Mar. 13, 1994, at 5 (noting that "[m]arketers can choose from among tens of
thousands of lists" which can be rented or sold).
236. Smolowe, supra note 235, at 66.
237. Id at 63.
238. Erik Larson, The Naked Consumer How Our Private Lives Become Public
Commodities 59 (1992).
239. Jacobs, supra note 235, at 5.
240. Thomas B. Rosenstiel, Huge Databases, All Unregulated, Imperil Privacy,
Phila. Inquirer, May 21, 1994, at A2.
241. See, e.g., Jacobs, supra note 235, at 5 (describing the "steady stream of un-
wanted mail" that consumers face). Some industries and organizations, however,
such as J. Crew and the American Civil Liberties Union, give individuals the chance
to "opt out by having their names withheld from lists." Id. The New York Tmes
subscriber service offers this option to new and old subscribers. Id.
242. What Price Privacy?, Consumer Rep., May 1, 1991, at 356, 357 (describing
Consolidated Information Service, a credit bureau in New York City).
243. Id.
244. Id.
19951
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have devastating effects.2 45 Further, once a computer error is commit-
ted, correcting it can be a daunting task. 46
Unbeknownst to most Americans, "personal data is [sic] being
manipulated for purposes other than those originally intended when
collected, and the parties engaging in such activities have no prior di-
rect relationship with the individual about whom the information per-
tains. '2 47 In many instances, Americans would be shocked to learn
how much of their lives are exposed to others.2 48 People may face the
possibility of discrimination by employers with access to sensitive in-
formation (e.g., prescriptions for medications for AIDS), or by insur-
ance companies wishing to avoid customers having high-risk leisure
activities (e.g., parachuting, scuba diving, or motorcycling). 49 Certain
supermarkets electronically monitor purchases of customers, who par-
ticipate in exchange for discounts.250 Medical data are frequently cir-
culated among insurance companies, drug companies, and marketers
peddling myriad health care remedies and gadgets.2 51 Undoubtedly,
the information superhighway will accelerate this trend.
Recent polls indicate that Americans are extremely concerned
about their privacy. According to a 1990 U.S. poll taken by Harris-
Equifax, 90% of Americans believe that the collection of personal in-
formation is a problem. 52 Often information is gathered simply "be-
cause it's there. '2 53 The same poll found that 79% of Americans are
concerned about their privacy and use of personal information, and
believe that privacy ranks with "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happi-
245. For example, a couple from St. Louis, Missouri, had a bankruptcy filing inad-
vertently placed in their files. Banks cut off their loans and they eventually had to file
for bankruptcy. Their suit failed because the law protects credit companies for "hon-
est" mistakes. Id.
246. Id.
247. NTIA Notice of Inquiry, supra note 227, at 6842; see also Reidenberg, supra
note 225, at 204-05 ("Information disclosed or collected for one purpose may easily
have an associated use in an entirely different and undesirable context.").
248. Studies have indicated that if people realized how personal information can
eventually be used, they might not have divulged it or entered into certain transac-
tions requesting it. See Reidenberg, supra note 225, at 205-06.
249. Jacobs, supra note 235, at 5.
250. Reidenberg, supra note 225, at 203.
251. Larry Tye, No Private Lives: Proposed 'Bill of Rights' Would Limit Personal
Data, Boston Globe, Sept. 8, 1993, at 1. For a discussion concerning the legal protec-
tion of the privacy of health care information and recommendations for reform, see
Paul M. Schwartz, The Protection of Privacy in Health Care Reform, 48 Vand. L. Rev.
295 (1995).
252. See Reidenberg, supra note 225, at 203 (summarizing the results of a 1990
Harris-Equifax poll). The same poll found that 57% of Americans believe that con-
sumers are asked to reveal excessive amounts of information. Id. at 203 n.37. Equifax,
a leading credit agency, stopped selling credit information to direct marketers in 1991
as a result of its poll. Consumer Credit Reports Get Special Attention, A.B.A. Banking
J., Mar. 1992, at 7, 9.
253. Reidenberg, supra note 225, at 203.
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ness" as a fundamental right.' Almost three-quarters believe that
they have lost control of the use and dissemination of personal infor-
mation.-55 Many experts fear that George Orwell's 1984 could soon
become a reality. Thus, it has become increasingly apparent that the
current laws on information practices must be revised to ensure indi-
viduals the right to privacy in this electronic environment.
I. GOVERNMENT COLLECriON OF PERSONAL INFORMATION
ON INDIVIDUALS
Congress has long grappled with the problems presented by the col-
lection and dissemination of personal information concerning individ-
uals through the development of sophisticated technologies. Congress
realized that the federal government's use of computers to store and
retrieve information about individuals increased the government's ef-
ficiency and effectiveness, but also threatened individual privacy.256
During the late 1960s and early 1970s, Congress held several hear-
ings on privacy and the protection of sensitive personal information
stored in computers." In a Senate hearing during this period, -ss
American legal scholar Arthur Miller detailed his concern for this
trend and the alarming increase of the government's use of personal
information that could be detrimental to individual privacy.
At one point, Congress considered the creation of a centralized data
center containing information on all American citizens, such as Social
Security numbers, income, and census data. Opposition, however,
was vehement. The opposition voiced concerns that computers can be
a method by which to achieve totalitarianism. The centralized data
plan was tabled until the security and confidentiality of such informa-
tion could be guaranteed.
254. Id. at 198-99 & n.14.
255. Id. at 199 n.14.
256. The legislative history of the Privacy Act of 1974 is collected in Senate Comm.
on Government Operations and Subcomm. on Government Information and Individ-
ual Rights of the House Comm. on Government Operations, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., Leg-
islative History of the Privacy Act of 1974, S. 3418 (Pub. L No. 93-579): Source Book
on Privacy (Joint Comm. Print 1976) [hereinafter Source Book.
257. See eg., Federal Data Banks, Computers and the Bill of Rights: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm on the Judiciary,
92nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); The Computer and Invasion of Privacy: Hearings Before
the Special Subcomm. on Invasion of Privacy of the House Comm. on Government
Operations, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966).
258. Professor Miller testified before the Senate in support of the Privacy Act in
1974. He stated:
I think if one reads Orwell and Huxley carefully, one realizes that '1984' is a
state of mind. In the past, dictatorships always have come with hobnailed
boots and tanks and machineguns, but a dictatorship of dossiers, a dictator-
ship of data banks can be just as repressive, just as chilling and just as
debilitating on our constitutional protections. I think it is this fear that
presents the greatest challenge to Congress right now.
Source Book, supra note 256, at 160.
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By 1973, the Watergate scandal had contributed to the growing pub-
lic malaise and overall distrust of the government and its ability to
probe into the personal affairs of individuals, 59 That year, the De-
partment of Health, Education and Welfare ("HEW") proposed a
Code of Fair Information Practices to be followed by federal
260agencies.
A. The Privacy Act of 1974
In 1974, Congress passed the Privacy Act of 1974 ("Privacy
Act"),26 1 to "promote accountability, responsibility, legislative over-
sight, and open government with respect to the use of computer tech-
nology in the personal information systems and databanks of the
Federal Government. 162 The Privacy Act of 1974 codified the follow-
ing principles:
(1) The privacy of an individual 263 is directly affected by the collec-
tion, maintenance, use, and dissemination of personal information
by Federal agencies;
(2) The increasing use of computers and sophisticated information
technology, while essential to the efficient operations of the Gov-
ernment, has greatly magnified the harm to individual privacy that
can occur from any collection, maintenance, use, or dissemination
of personal information;
(3) The opportunities for an individual to secure employment, in-
surance, and credit, and his right to due process and other legal pro-
tections are endangered by the misuse of certain information
systems;
(4) The right to privacy is a personal and fundamental right pro-
tected by the Constitution of the United States; and
(5) In order to protect the privacy of individuals identified in infor-
mation systems maintained by Federal agencies, it is necessary and
259. See H.R. Rep. No. 1416, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1974).
260. U.S. Dep't of Health, Educ. and Welfare, Records, Computers and the Rights
of Citizens xx-xxi (1973). The fundamental principles of the Code were: (1) there
must be no personal data record-keeping systems whose very existence is secret; (2)
there must be a way for individuals to find out what information is in their file and
how the information is being used; (3) there must be a way for individuals to correct
information in their records; (4) any organization creating, maintaining, using, or dis-
seminating records of personally identifiable information must assure the reliability of
the data for its intended use and must take precautions to prevent misuse; and (5)
there must be a way for individuals to prevent personal information obtained for one
purpose from being used for another purpose without consent. Id. This Code served
not only as the framework for the Privacy Act of 1974, but also as the model for
privacy legislation worldwide.
261. Pub. L. No. 93-579, 88 Stat. 1896 (current version codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552a
(1994)).
262. S. Rep. No. 1183, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1974).
263. The Privacy Act defines an "individual" as "a citizen of the United States or
an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence." 5 U.S.C. § 552a(a)(2) (1994).
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proper for the Congress to regulate the collection, maintenance,
use, and dissemination of information by such agencies. 4
These principles were to serve as an "'Information Bill of Rights'
for citizens and a 'Code of Fair Information Practices' for federal
agencies."265 For example, with certain exceptions, the Privacy Act
prohibits government agencies from disclosing any record on any indi-
vidual for any purpose other than that originally intended without that
individual's consent.26 The Privacy Act also grants individuals a right
of access to their records and the opportunity to amend their records
based on a showing of a lack of accuracy, relevancy, timeliness, or
completion.267 To enforce certain provisions, individuals may bring a
civil action against the agency for damages or injunctive relief, based
on a showing of harm resulting from a government agency's inten-
tional or willful act.268 Individual officers or employees of agencies
can also be subject to criminal sanctions under certain
circumstances 269
In 1977, the United States Privacy Protection Study Commission
published a report270 assessing the effectiveness of the Privacy Act.
The Commission's report concluded that the Privacy Act "has not re-
sulted in the general benefits to the public" and "ignores ... some
personal-data record-keeping policy issues of major importance now
and for the future."27 To remedy these deficiencies, the Commission
proposed that the Privacy Act be revised to clarify "the ambiguous
language,"2  provide individuals with broader remedies, and limit the
"routine-use" exemption.273
In 1988, the Privacy Act was amended by the Computer Matching
and Privacy Protection Act of 1988 ("Matching Act").214 The purpose
of the amendment was to regulate the use of data-matching proce-
dures in federal agencies. This law, which regulates the matching of
government files on individuals, such as lists of welfare recipients and
interagency payroll records, has generated much debate in the area of
privacy.275 From the government's perspective, data matching is a
264. Id § 552a.
265. Jerry Berman & Janlori Goldman, Benton Foundation Project on Communica-
tions & Information Policy Options, A Federal Right of Information Privacy: The
Need for Reform 13 (1989) [hereinafter Benton Foundation Report].
266. 5 U.S.C. § 522a(b) (1994).
267. Id. § 522a(d)(2)(B)(i).
268. Id. § 522a(g).
269. Id. § 522a(i).
270. U.S. Privacy Protection Study Commission, Personal Privacy in an Informa-
tion Society (1977).
271. Id. at 502-03.
272. Id. at 503.
273. Id. at 515-21.
274. Pub. L. No. 100-503, 102 Stat. 2507-14 (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1994)).
275. See Nimmer, supra note 223, 16.09, at 16-28.
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cost-efficient way to allocate public resources276 and detect waste,
fraud, and abuse of government programs.277
Privacy advocates, however, view data matching as a form of "un-
necessary incursion into privacy interests. ' 278 While the Matching Act
did not limit the types of records that could be matched, it set forth a
procedural framework requiring more adequate notice to individuals
of the right to a hearing before benefits are cut off or denied, and
mandatory reporting requirements for government agencies that
match records.279
B. Criticisms of the Privacy Act of 1974 and Proposals for Change
In recent years, there has been a growing sentiment that the Privacy
Act has failed to address new privacy concerns resulting from the in-
creasing use of computerized records. For example, in a 1986 report,
the Office of Technology Assessment ("OTA") reported that federal
and institutional use of new electronic technologies in processing,
comparing, and linking personal information has eroded the protec-2110
tions of the Privacy Act. Two experts from the American Civil Lib-
erties Union ("ACLU"), a privacy watchdog, criticized the Privacy
Act for falling far short of achieving its initial objectives. They argued
that the Privacy Act was "at best serving as a procedural hoop-jump
for federal agencies,"281 and charged government agencies with esca-
lating, rather than limiting, the government's collection and dissemi-282
nation of personal information. In their view, Congress has failed
to control the widespread misuse of an individual's Social Security
number, not only by authorizing its use,283 but mandating it.284 For
example, a 1986 Tax Reform Act provision requires that all children
over five years of age who are claimed as dependents be assigned a
Social Security number.285
276. Id.
277. Benton Foundation Report, supra note 265, at 14.
278. Nimmer, supra note 223, J 16.09, at 16-28. For an insightful discussion con-
cerning the problems associated with computer matching programs, see Kenneth J.
Langan, Computer Matching Programs: A Threat to Privacy?, 15 Colum. J.L. & Soc.
Probs. 143 (1979).
279. The Computer Matching and Privacy Protection Act of 1988, 5 U.S.C.
§ 552a(p)(1) (1994).
280. See Benton Foundation Report, supra note 265, at 2, 30 n.7.
281. Id. at 14.
282. Id.
283. Id. at 16; see also Letter from Electronic Frontier Foundation to Working
Group on Privacy 7 (July 6, 1994) [hereinafter EFF Letter] (on file with the Fordham
Law Review). The 1976 Tax Reform Act authorized states to use Social Security
numbers for state or local tax purposes, welfare systems, driver's license systems, and
locating parents delinquent in court-imposed child support payments, Id. (citation
omitted).
284. Benton Foundation Report, supra note 265, at 16.
285. Id. (citing Tax Reform Act of 1986, 26 U.S.C. § 6109(e) (1988)); see also EFF
Letter, supra note 283, at 7.
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The Clinton Administration created a federal interagency task force
in September 1993, called the Information Infrastructure Task Force
("ITF"), to work with Congress and the private sector on ways to
advance the NIl1 86 The ITF set up the Working Group on Privacy
("Working Group") 227 to investigate ways to balance society's need
for the flow of information and the privacy interests of individuals?8
In May 1994, the Working Group published a set of principles ad-
dressing two major changes in information technology in the past two
decades: the emergence of large privately-held databases and the de-
velopment of interactive technologies. 289 The Working Group Draft,
which requested public comment by June 1994, identified certain prin-
ciples associated with the deterioration of privacy in the United
States. These principles are discussed below.
1. General Principles for the NII-"Reasonable Expectation of
Privacy" and "Information Integrity"
The Working Group Draft recommended that, to the extent reason-
able, users of the NII "[e]nsure that information is secure, using
whatever means are appropriate." 2 1 The Electronic Frontier Founda-
tion ("EFF"),2 9' a group commenting on the Working Group Draft
principles, pointed out the difficulty in determining and applying a
"reasonable expectation of privacy standard." 29 This is especially
true in an interactive electronic environment where many levels of
users participate in the exchange of information. The EFF believes
that such a reasonableness standard "will depend on the legal and reg-
ulatory protections set by Congress and the agencies. ' 9  It recom-
mended that the iTF draft a new legal definition of reasonable
expectation of privacy that entails "an objective expectation of privacy
protection, irrespective of the technological capability to intrude."'
286. The National Information Infrastructure: Agenda for Action. 58 Fed. Reg.
49,025, 49,035 (1993) [hereinafter NTIA Agenda for Action].
287. The Working Group on Privacy was set up by the Information Policy Commit-
tee of the IIT. This Working Group proposes to update the Code of Fair Informa-
tion Practices developed by the HEW, the framework for the Privacy Act of 1974.
Draft Principles for Providing and Using Personal Information. 59 Fed. Reg. 27,206
(1994) (proposed May 25, 1994) [hereinafter Working Group Draft]
288. See NTIA Agenda for Action, supra note 286, at 49,035.
289. Working Group Draft, supra note 287, at 27,206. Another set of Draft Princi-
ples was issued on January 20, 1995. See National Information Infrastructure; Draft
Principles for Providing and Using Personal Information and Commentary, 60 Fed.
Reg. 4362 (1995) (proposed Jan. 20, 1995). Comments were due by March 21, 1995.
Id.
290. Working Group Draft, supra note 287, at 27,206.
291. The EFF, formed in July 1990, is a nonprofit public interest group, -dedicated
to preserving and enhancing civil liberties in digital media.., focus[ing] on privacy
issues in the new electronic age." EFF Letter, supra note 283, at 1.
292. 1& at 4-5.
293. Id. at 5.
294. Id. at 6.
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2. Principles for Information Collectors29 5
The Working Group Draft recommended that information collec-
tors inform individuals of the purpose for which the information is
being collected, its expected use, its protection in terms of confidenti-
ality and integrity, the repercussions of providing or withholding in-
formation, and rights of redress.2 96 The EFF suggested that the
" 'routine use' exemption ... clarif[y] that disclosure for a routine use
must be consistent with the original purpose for which the information
was originally collected. '297 Individuals must have the right to chal-
lenge any inconsistency with the proposed routine use and original
purpose of the collection. 98 Further, routine uses, in the opinion of
the EFF, should be "benign and not for the purpose of taking adverse
action against an individual. 2 99
3. Principles for Information Users300
The Working Group Draft recommended allowing "individuals to
limit the use of their personal information if the intended use is in-
compatible with the original purpose for which it was collected, unless
that use is authorized by law."'301 As noted above, Congress not only
allows, but mandates the use of Social Security numbers at certain
times. The EFF proposed limiting the authority of government agen-
cies "to collect only information necessary and relevant to their partic-
ular purpose," and requiring the agencies to inform individuals of the
reasons for collection and the purposes for which it will be used. 0
a. Fairness Principles
The Working Group Draft also provided that users of information
offer individuals "a reasonable means to obtain, review, and correct
their own information., 30 3 Additionally, the draft proposed that indi-
viduals be provided the opportunity "to correct inaccurate informa-
tion [if the inaccuracy] could harm them."3 1 Because it is critical for
295. The Working Group defines information collectors as "entities that collect
personal information directly from the individual." Working Group Draft, supra note
287, at 27,206.
296. Id.
297. EFF Letter, supra note 283, at 6-7. The authors of the Benton Foundation
Report, a director and a staff attorney of the ACLU, share this view. See Benton
Foundation Report, supra note 265, at 24.
298. EFF Letter, supra note 283, at 7.
299. Id.
300. The Working Group defines information users as "[clollectors and entities that
obtain, process, send or store personal information." Working Group Draft, supra
note 287, at 27,207.
301. Id.
302. EFF Letter, supra note 283, at 7-8.
303. Working Group Draft, supra note 287, at 27,207.
304. Id. In 1977, the Privacy Commission did not suggest changes to the original
language in the Privacy Act regarding the accuracy of records. Individuals thus have
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individuals to correct inaccurate information to prevent the propaga-
tion of errors, the EFF recommended that "users and collectors of
information should develop technical mechanisms to detect, locate,
and fix problems and correct errors."3 ' In the EFF's view, "the right
to correct [inaccurate] information should be incorporated into the
design of all information systems." 3 6
b. Acquisition and Use Principles
The Working Group recommended that "users of personal informa-
tion should... [o]btain and keep only information that could reason-
ably be expected to support current or planned activities and use the
information only for those or compatible purposes. 3 7 Further, the
Working Group Draft stated that "[i]nformation users should . . .
[a]llow individuals to limit the use of their personal information if the
intended use is incompatible with the original purpose for which it was
collected. 30 As some commentators have noted, the "routine use"
exemption has been used to thwart the government's interpretation of
"compatible" use.3°
c. Redress Principles
The Working Group proposed that the right to redress should de-
pend on the ability of an individual to show harm "resulting from in-
accurate or improperly used personal information. '310 In some cases,
however, adverse claims go unnoticed, and "redress will not be avail-
able."31' The Working Group further commented that "individuals
should be able to obtain from data users.., a copy of this personal
information and have the opportunity to correct inaccurate
information. ' '31u
The EFF reported that in reality, however, "it is extremely difficult
for individuals to obtain relief under the .. . Privacy Act," even if
actual harm occurs.3 13 A plaintiff must prove that the government ac-
ted intentionally and willfully.314 This "one sidedness" in favor of the
government record keeper is described as "one of the most ugly faces
no opportunity to correct inaccurate information. See 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(1), (5)
(1994).
305. EFF Letter, supra note 283, at 9 (citation omitted).
306. Id.
307. Working Group Draft, supra note 287, at 27,207.
308. Id.
309. See Benton Foundation Report, supra note 265, at 14; EFF Letter, supra note
283, at 6-7.
310. See Working Group Draft, supra note 287, at 27,207.
311. Id. at 27,209.
312. Id. at 27,211.
313. EFF Letter, supra note 283, at 8.
314. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(4) (1994).
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of privacy." '315 Moreover, as one scholar has noted, "unless an agency
is cooperative, the procedures for review can be time-consuming and
expensive. 316
To remedy these shortcomings, the EFF proposed a new section
that provides both liquidated damages and injunctive relief for harms,
including intangible harms, without requiring a showing of an adverse
effect to the plaintiff.317 Further, the EFF recommended that individ-
uals "be informed of any actions taken as a result of incorrect
information. 318
4. Principles for Providing and Using Information
The Preamble of the Working Group Draft recited that "new princi-
ples [emerging as a result of the NII] must acknowledge that all mem-
bers of our society (government, industry, and individual citizens),
share responsibility for ensuring the fair treatment of individuals in
the use of personal information. ' 319 Likewise, these individuals have
a responsibility to obtain "adequate, relevant information" on: uses
(primary and secondary) of the information; 320 efforts to protect the
integrity and confidentiality of the information;32' consequences for
providing or withholding information; 32 and rights of redress. 323 The
EFF believes that the ultimate responsibility for maintaining fair in-
formation should be placed on the collectors and users of information,
not on the individuals who disclose the information.324
II. PRIVATE COLLECTION OF INFORMATION ON INDIVIDUALS
The collection of data on individuals by institutions in the private
sector can also threaten the privacy interests of individuals. Private
institutions, such as banks, credit card companies, and insurance com-
panies, have the capacity to collect vast amounts of information about
individuals,325 which can be highly intrusive into their private lives.
Furthermore, once such information has been collected and stored in
computer systems, it can be analyzed and made available to secondary
users "in the form of mailing lists and other information products. 32 6
315. EFF Letter, supra note 283, at 8 (quoting Willis H. Ware, The New Faces of
Privacy, 9 Info. Soc'y 195, 203 (1993)).
316. Nimmer, supra note 223, 16.08[3].
317. EFF Letter, supra note 283, at 8.
318. Id.
319. Working Group Draft, supra note 287, at 27,206.
320. Id. at 27,207.
321. Id.
322. Id.
323. Id.; see also id. at 27,210 (expanding on the awareness principles which allow
the individual to make informed decisions about the information that they disclose).
324. EFF Letter, supra note 283, at 10.
325. Nimmer, supra note 223, 16.17.
326. Id.
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Some uses of this information may merely be annoying, but others are
more serious.
On the other hand, some Americans argue that consumers may ac-
tually benefit from wide dissemination of personal information. For
example, they claim that the liberal exchange of financial data facili-
tates the provision of credit to consumers and enables creditors to
charge lower interest rates to reliable debtors.327 Retailers and mar-
keters argue that by targeting their audience, they conserve paper,
drive down prices, and increase consumer choice.3za Mail-order shop-
ping may be convenient and even essential for people with small chil-
dren, physical disability, or little time to shop.3 29 The environmentally
conscious claim that mail-order shopping saves on gas and reduces
traffic congestion. 330 Because wide dissemination of personal infor-
mation may be beneficial, annoying, or harmful, determining who
owns and has the right to control information on individuals is crucial.
At the present time, there is no omnibus privacy legislation applica-331
ble to the private sector in the United States. In 1993, Senator Paul
Simon (D-Ill.), proposed legislation that would create a Privacy Pro-
tection Commission.332 This five-member independent commission
would issue advisory opinions on the use and dissemination of per-
sonal information, investigate alleged abuses in publicly and privately
maintained data bases, and oversee telecommunications and elec-
tronic privacy disputes and related security issues.333 The Commission
would not have enforcement powers.3M This bill has stalled in Con-
gress several times. The federal legislation that exists today has devel-
oped in an ad hoc manner, focusing on the privacy issues of specific
industries.
327. See Steven A. Bibas, A Contractual Approacz to Data Privacy, 17 Harv. J.L &
Pub. Pory 591, 598-99 (1994) (citing several arguments in favor of the uninhibited
flow of information).
328. Daniel Klein & Jason Richner, In Defense of that Pesky Junk Mail, Chi. Trib.,
Apr. 20, 1992, § 1, at 19.
329. Id.
330. Id.
331. See Reidenberg, supra note 225, at 201. In contrast, several European nations
have adopted omnibus legislation governing private sector data processing. ld. The
European Community issued a draft directive on September 13, 1990. In addition, in
February, 1995, the European Community approved a data protection measure that
attempted to standardize existing national laws on the use of information gathered by
states and governments. A new directive was pending approval by the European Par-
liament in the summer of 1995. Further, two important international organizations,
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development and the Council of
Europe, have set forth principles for information processing in the private sector. See
id. at 200-01; Robert G. Boehmer & Todd S. Palmer, The 1992 E.C, Data Protection
Proposa" An Examination of Its Implications for U.S. Business and U.S. Privacy Law,
31 Am. Bus. LJ. 265 (1993).
332. S. 1735, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 3-4 (1993); see 139 Cong. Rec. S16433,
S16493-94 (1993).
333. S. 1735, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 6 (1993).
334. See id. § 8.
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A. Financial Data
One area frequently litigated in the private sector falls under the
Fair Credit Reporting Act ("FCRA"),335 which Congress passed in
1970. This law regulates the disclosure of personal information by
credit reporting agencies, but not the collection of such information.
Under the FCRA, consumers may review their own records and cor-
rect inaccuracies. Information-collecting agencies may only disclose
such information pursuant to a consumer's written instruction, a court
order, or for certain enumerated purposes.336 These agencies, how-
ever, are not required to notify individuals of the existence, content,
or use of such records. Thus, as a practical matter, individuals may
have difficulty enforcing their rights under the FCRA.337
Another law that affects credit activities and the use of personal
information is the Fair Credit Billing Act of 1974,338 which requires
that consumers receive copies of consumer credit transaction records
and have the right to correct inaccuracies.339 Creditors are prohibited
from disclosing information about late payments pending error resolu-
tion, but are not otherwise restricted from disclosing transaction
records to third parties. Likewise, the Fair Debt Collection Practices
Act of 1977340 restricts communication to third parties of a debtor's
financial status to information regarding the collection.341 The Equal
Credit Opportunity Act of 1974342 prohibits dissemination regarding
any aspect of credit on the basis of race, color, religion, national ori-
gin, sex, marital status, or age.343 This law entitles individual appli-
cants to a "statement of reasons" for denial of credit.34
The Electronic Fund Transfer Act of 1978 ("EFTA") 345 sets forth
mandatory guidelines governing the use of electronic systems to trans-
fer funds.4 For example, EFTA requires detailed documentation of
transaction data, such as the amount, date, and location of each trans-
335. 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (1994).
336. These purposes include extension of credit, review or collection of an account,
employment, underwriting insurance, determination of eligibility for government ben-
efits, and any legitimate business need in connection with a transaction involving the
consumer. 15 U.S.C. § 1681b (1994).
337. See Reidenberg, supra note 225, at 211-12. Once the information is dissemi-
nated in accordance with the statute, the recipient will not necessarily be restricted
from further circulating the information without the individual's consent. In certain
circumstances, however, a secondary user of information may be considered a credit
reporting agency and thus subject to the FCRA's disclosure restrictions. See 15 U.S.C.
§ 1681a(f) (1994).
338. Id. § 1666.
339. See id. § 1666(a).
340. Id. § 1692.
341. Id. § 1692c(b).
342. Id. § 1691.
343. Id. § 1691(a)(1).
344. Id. § 1691(d)(2).
345. Id. § 1693.
346. Id. § 1693(b).
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fer, and requires financial institutions to provide consumers with peri-
odic statements. EFTA has mandatory error resolution procedures.
The EFTA, however, does not restrict the disclosure of transaction
information to third parties or the duration information may be
stored.
In 1978, Congress passed the Right to Financial Privacy Act,3 7
which set forth procedural restrictions on the access of federal agen-
cies to data held by a depository institution.348 Congress enacted the
Privacy Protection Act349 in 1980 to prohibit government searches of
press offices without a warrant if there is no suspicion of criminal ac-
tivity.350 In 1982, Congress granted individuals due process protection
before the release of any federal debt information to a private credit
bureau.35' The Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982352
restricts the disclosure of tax return information for purposes unre-
lated to tax administration.353 This law authorizes disclosure of tax
return information to law enforcement agencies to combat organized
crime, narcotics trafficking, and other non-tax crimes.3-
B. Solicitations
The Deceptive Mailings Prevention Act35 5 bans mail solicitations
that look like government notices356 and prey upon the elderly and
others, such as expectant mothers, who need to apply for Social Secur-
ity cards. This law empowers the United States Postal Service to stop
delivery of a mail solicitation that may reasonably mislead the public
into believing that it was sent by the government or is government
approved.357
To address telemarketing concerns, Congress passed the Telephone
Consumer Protection Act358 in 1991, permitting the Federal Commu-
nications Commission ("FCC") to designate an entity (in the usual
case, the entity will be a company) to maintain "do not call" lists and
347. 12 U.S.C. § 3401 (1994). The Right to Financial Privacy Act was passed to
overturn the Supreme Court decision, United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976). In
Miller, the Court held that an individual had no enforceable expectation of privacy for
records held by the bank. Id at 441-43. Thus, the bank had a right to turn over data
without the customer's knowledge to a grand jury in response to a subpoena. See id.
348. 12 U.S.C. § 3402 (1994).
349. 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa (1988).
350. 1&
351. 31 U.S.C. § 3716(a) (1988).
352. Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L No. 97-248, 96 Stat.
324 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
353. 26 U.S.C. § 6103 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
354. Id. § 6103(i)(1)(A).
355. Deceptive Mailings Prevention Act of 1990, Pub. L No. 101-524, 104 Stat.
2301 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 39 U.S.C.)
356. See 39 U.S.C. § 3001(h) (Supp. V 1993).
357. Id
358. Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L No. 102-243, 105 Stat.
2394 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
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honor consumer requests to be added to those lists. 35 9 This law, which
amends the Communications Act of 1934,360 directs the FCC to regu-
late telephone solicitations.361 It is frequently described as a privacy
law, but it really regulates nuisance calls employing pre-recorded
messages or automatic dialing equipment.
C. Education Data
The Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (the "Education
Rights Act")362 was passed in 1974 to regulate the disclosure of and
access to educational records. 363 This law allows students to review
their records and prohibits educational institutions from disclosing the
content of a student's fie, except in limited circumstances. 364 Federal
funding of educational institutions may be terminated for noncompli-
ance.365 The Education Rights Act does not provide for a private
cause of action for an affected individual. 366
D. Driver's Records
The Driver's Privacy Protection Act of 1994367 was passed in Octo-
ber 1994, making it a crime for state motor vehicle offices to release
certain information about a licensee without a legitimate purpose.
Under this law, individual states have three years to prepare regula-
tions that will allow drivers to opt out of having personal information
released, such as age and address.368
359. 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(3) (Supp. V 1993).
360. 47 U.S.C. § 151-613 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
361. See id. § 151.
362. Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-380, 88
Stat. 571 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.). This law pertains
to schools that are federally funded and does not require the school to protect against
the dissemination of student information through non-school sources. Frasca v. An-
drews, 463 F. Supp. 1043, 1050 (E.D.N.Y. 1979). But see Fay v. South Colonie Cent.
Sch. Dist., 802 F.2d 21, 33 (2d Cir. 1986) (holding that this Act, used in conjunction
with other federal statutes, allows for private causes of action).
363. See 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (1994).
364. For example, educational institutions may disclose information contained in
student records to student officials who need to know, research organizations, govern-
ment officials, and people with enforcement subpoenas. Id. § 1232g(b). "Parents are
permitted access to [an] institution's file, except [to view] confidential letters of rec-
ommendation and personal financial statements of college students." Nimmer, supra
note 223, 16.19.
365. 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(f) (1994).
366. Fay, 802 F.2d at 33; Girardier v. Webster College, 563 F.2d 1267, 1276-77 (8th
Cir. 1977); Smith v. Duquesne Univ., 612 F. Supp. 72, 80 (W.D. Pa. 1985), aff'd, 787
F.2d 583 (3d Cir. 1986).
367. 18 U.S.C. § 2721 (1994).
368. See id. § 2721(b)(11)-(12).
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E. Health Care Data
The processing and use of health care information "plays a critical
role in the provision, regulation, and financing of medical services by
government and private entities."369 Information is no longer exclu-
sively in the hands of health care providers but is increasingly shared
among a wide variety of entities as well.370 There has been no notice-
able change in the legal scheme since the Privacy Protection Study
Commission completed its study almost twenty years ago.371 One re-
cent Office of Technology Report concluded that: "The present legal
scheme does not provide consistent, comprehensive protection for pri-
vacy in health care information, whether it exists in a paper or com-
puterized environment."'  Indeed, one government policy analyst
noted that "video rental records are afforded more privacy protection
than are medical records." 373
There are a few federal statutes, other than the Privacy Act of 1974,
that govern the use of medical data. For example, federal alcohol and
drug treatment statutes, with certain exceptions, prohibit the disclo-
sure of an individual's participation in a rehabilitation program, with-
out that individual's prior consent.3 74 Aside from these laws,
however, federal laws that restrict the use of health data once it has
been obtained, have proven largely ineffective. 37
369. Schwartz, supra note 251, at 300. For an analysis of international develop-
ments concerning the protection of medical data, see id. at 324-33; Spiros Simitis,
Reviewing Privacy in an Information Society, 135 U. Pa. L Rev. 707 (1987).
370. See Schwartz, supra note 251, at 301. There are three zones where such infor-
mation is used. "zone one is direct patient care (doctors, clinics, nursing homes); zone
two consists of supporting and administrative activities (service payers, third party
administrators, quality of care reviewers); and zone three includes.. . 'secondary
uses' [of medical data] (credential and evaluation decisions, public health reporting,
social welfare programs, direct marketing)." Id. (citing Alan F. Westin, Interpretative
Essay, in Harris-Equifax, Health Information Privacy Survey 7 (1993)).
371. Id.
372. Office of Technology Assessment, U.S. Congress, Protecting Privacy in Com-
puterized Medical Information 13 (1993).
373. Sheri A. Alpert, Smart Cards, Smarter Policy: Medical Records, Privacy and
Health Care Reform, 23 Hastings Center Rep. 13 (Nov.-Dec. 1993).
374. The Comprehensive Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism Prevention, Treatment
and Rehabilitation Act of 1970, 42 U.S.C. § 290ee-3 (1988); The Drug Abuse Office
and Treatment Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C. § 290dd-2 (Supp. V 1993). Exceptions include
the response to medical emergencies, court order, or in furtherance of scientific re-
search. 42 U.S.C. § 290dd-2(b) (Supp. V 1993). These federal protections generally
apply to government actions, but not to private actions. Schwartz, supra note 251, at
320. Private clinics for substance abuse that receive federal funds are required to
adhere to federal standards for release of medical information, but privately funded
facilities are not. Id.
375. Schwartz, supra note 251, at 318-19; see infra part 1.G2.
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Congress requires the Department of Health and Human Services
to provide data protection for Social Security records. 376 This mea-
sure, however, allows for disclosures "as otherwise provided by Fed-
eral law" and pursuant to regulations issued by the Secretary.377
The Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") prohibits employers
from considering the disabilities of individuals in making employment
decisions.378 Yet individuals are likely unaware or unable to prove job
discrimination based on health information.379 Finally, the Age Dis-
crimination in Employment Act ("ADEA")3 11 prohibits the hiring or
firing of employees based on age, but not for problems related to
health.38'
State privacy acts, which are modeled after the federal Privacy Act
of 1974, provide some assurance that state-held medical records will
not be disclosed to third parties without first obtaining the patient's
consent.382 These laws, however, do not succeed in overcoming the
weaknesses in current federal data protection.383
The Uniform Health-Care Information Act,3 84 which is subject to
modification by state legislatures before passage, has been adopted by
only a handful of states thus far.385 Only two types of state health-
376. 42 U.S.C. § 1306(a) (1988). "Social security records often contain a variety of
medical information... [which] is most typically collected in connection with claims
for disability benefits." Schwartz, supra note 251, at 318 n.118.
377. 42 U.S.C. § 1306(a) (1988).
378. 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (Supp. V 1993).
379. See Robert L. Burgdorf Jr., The Americans with Disabilities Act: Analysis and
Implications of a Second-Generation Civil Rights Statute, 26 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev.
413, 434-37 (1991); see also Dorothy Nelkin & M. Susan Lindee, The DNA Mystique:
The Gene as a Cultural Icon 167 (1995) (stating that the ADA "does not preclude the
use of 'sound actuarial data' as a basis on which to limit health care benefits"). Nelkin
and Lindee are concerned that while laws such as the ADA may curb specilic institu-
tional abuses, it is harder to control popular and cultural attitudes that lead to infor-
mal discrimination based on knowledge of an individual's genetic information. See id.
For an interesting discussion of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, see
Rosemary E. Mahoney & Allan Gibofsky, The Americans with Disabilities Act of
1990: Changes in Existing Protection and Impact on the Private Health Services Pro-
vider, 13 J. Legal Med. 51 (1992).
380. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1988).
381. Id.; Schwartz, supra note 251, at 319.
382. See, e.g., Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 66A, § 2(c) (Law. Co-op. 1991) (requiring sub-ject's authorization prior to release of information or authorized by statute in compli-
ance with this chapter); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 13.04 subd. 2 (West 1995) (same); Ohio
Rev. Code Ann. § 1347.05(G) (Anderson 1994) (requiring "reasonable precautions to
protect personal information ... from unauthorized... disclosure"); Va. Code Ann.
§ 2.1-382 (Michie 1995) (requiring notice to the individual prior to disclosure of per-
sonal information).
383. See Schwartz, supra note 251, at 320-24 (discussing state statutes concerning
data protection).
384. Id.
385. Schwartz, supra note 251, at 322; see also Mont. Code Ann. § 50-16-501 (1993)
(adopting the Act); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 70.02.005 to -.02.904 (West 1992 & Supp.
1995) (same).
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record legislation are common to virtually every state. '  Such state
statutes require physicians, hospitals, and laboratories to file reports
to state health care authorities concerning knife and gunshot wounds,
sexually transmitted diseases, H!V infection, and communicable dis-
eases, such as tuberculosis.387 Second, most states recognize some
type of provider patient-privilege.3s In judicial proceedings, such a
privilege permits the patient to restrict the physician (and sometimes
other health professionals) from disclosing health information re-
ceived by the patient in confidence.m
F. Multimedia Transactions390
Congress has passed several laws that address multimedia transac-
tions and their inherent threats to privacy. This subsection discusses
several of those laws.
1. Cable Television
Cable television systems can threaten consumer privacy because
they have the capacity to collect and store information about "the be-
havior, information needs, and entertainment preferences of individu-
als. 391  In response to this threat, Congress passed the Cable
Communications Policy Act of 1984 (the "1984 Cable Act"),39 which
imposes restrictions on the collection, use, and dissemination of sub-
scriber information by cable systems operators, such as viewing habits
of cable subscribers. This law requires cable operators to inform their
subscribers annually of the nature of personally identifiable informa-
tion collected about their subscribers, the cable company's disclosure
practices, and their subscribers' rights to inspect and correct errors in
such data.393 The 1984 Cable Act permits operators to sell their mail-
ing lists to third parties only if they have given their subscribers an
386. Unif. Health-Care Info. Act, 9 U.L.A. 475, 476 (1988) (prefatory note) [here-
inafter Prefatory Note].
387. Id.; see, e.g., Ark. Code Ann. § 12-12-602 (Michie 1987) (requiring the report-
ing of knife and gunshot wounds); Cal. Health & Safety Code § 199.21 (West Supp.
1995) (discussing HIV reporting requirements).
388. Id.
389. Prefatory Note, supra note 386, at 476. South Carolina, Texas, and Vermont
do not have health care provider-patient statutes and are exceptions to this rule. Id.
Most state statutes expressly allow the patient to waive this privilege. Id. Physicians
can be compelled to give information in court-ordered examinations in cases of child
abuse, involuntary hospitalization, and when a patient relies upon his medical condi-
tion as a defense. l
390. The NTIA Notice of Inquiry requested comments on multimedia transactions
for March 1994. At the present time, we do not have copies of any comments.
391. Nimmer, supra note 223, 1 16.21.
392. 47 U.S.C. § 551 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
393. Id.
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opportunity to limit such disclosure, and such information does not
reveal the viewing habits or other transactions of the subscriber.394
The Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of
1992 (the "1992 Cable Act")395 extends the protections of the 1984
Cable Act to new wire and radio services that may be provided over
cable facilities. In addition, the 1992 Cable Act requires cable opera-
tors to "take such actions as are necessary to prevent unauthorized
access to such information by a person other than the subscriber or
cable operator. ' '396
2. Video
In 1988, Congress passed the Video Privacy Protection Act (the
"1988 Video Act") 397 to protect the privacy of video cassette rentals
and sales. For example, this law prohibits the disclosure of informa-
tion that individuals have rented specific videos. 398 The 1988 Video
Act also bars video cable service providers from disclosing to anyone
the titles of video cassettes rented or purchased by a particular indi-
vidual without that individual's consent. The 1988 Video Act, how-
ever, allows service providers to release customer mailing lists and
subject matter (but not specific titles) of customer selections as long as
the customer has been given the opportunity to object.399
3. Electronic Communications
Congress passed the Electronic Communications Privacy Act
("ECPA"I) 4 ° in 1986, amending the federal Wiretap Law401 to include
electronic communications. Prior to this amendment, the wiretap law
covered only oral and wire (telephone) communications. The ECPA
prohibits the unauthorized eavesdropping and interception of the con-
tent of e-mail, radio communications, data transmission, and tele-
phone calls. The ECPA's concern is only with data in transit, rather
394. Id.
395. Pub. L. No. 102-385 § 20, 106 Stat. 1460, 1497 (1992) (codified in scattered
sections of the Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-613).
396. Id. at 106 Stat. 1498.
397. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2710-2711 (1994).
398. The impetus behind this legislation was the public disclosure of Judge Robert
Bork's video rental history when he was under consideration for the Supreme Court.
Reidenberg, supra note 225, at 218.
399. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2710-2711 (1994).
400. Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522, 2701-
2711 (1994)). This law reversed the holding in Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735
(1979), in which the Supreme Court held that pen registers, a device in a telephone
line to record the numbers called from that line, are not private. Id. at 741-42. The
Court reasoned that callers could have no reasonable expectation of privacy regarding
the numbers they called, given the knowledge that the numbers are communicated to
the telephone company. Id. at 742.
401. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 (1994). Wiretapping is a form of electronic or mechan-
ical eavesdropping on phone calls or other communications. Black's Law Dictionary
1601 (6th ed. 1990).
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than information that is being stored4°2 or has already reached its
destination." 3
The ECPA specifically addresses the issue of stored information in a
separate section, which protects e-mail from (1) unauthorized access,
alteration and disruption, and (2) unauthorized disclosure. The first
provision proscribes hacking-type activity, 4 while the second pro-
tects the privacy of e-mail from unintended recipients without authori-
zation. Communications that are "stored" are not subject to stringent
warrant requirements.
There has been very little case law interpreting the application of
the ECPA to e-mail. Recently, the Fifth Circuit in Steve Jackson
Games, Inc. v. United States Secret Service,1'5 held that the ECPA does
not require a court order to seize in-transit e-mail, including electroni-
cally stored information, i.e., electronic communications in a "tempo-
rary, intermediate storage... incidental to the electronic transmission
thereof."4°
In essence, the court sided with the Secret Service, which argued
that the crucial factor is whether the message is sitting still or moving
through the wires when it is caught by the government. The former
situation requires a warrant; the latter does not. Hence, the Fifth Cir-
cuit ruled that information that had been posted on a bulletin board,
but not yet read by its recipients, was not improperly seized."°
The ECPA will soon be tested in a federal court in Illinois, in what
may be the first case addressing the privacy of employee voice mail in
the workplace. In January of 1995, Michael Huffcut, a manager of a
McDonald's restaurant in Elmira, New York, filed a lawsuit alleging
that his former co-manager recorded personal voice mail messages
that Huffcut had left for his lover (also a McDonald's employee) and
played them for his wife.4° Huffcut and his wife sued the restaurant
402. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(17) (1994). This section of the ECPA defines "electronic
storage" as: "any temporary, intermediate storage of a wire or electronic communica-
tion incidental to the electronic transmission thereof; and... any storage of such
communication by an electronic communication service for purposes of backup pro-
tection of such communication." l
403. For the purposes of the ECPA, interception includes the acquisition of oral,
wire, or electronic communications through an electronic, mechanical, or other de-
vice. Nimmer, supra note 223, 1 12.19[2]. Unauthorized interception of oral, wire, or
electronic communications can result in both civil and criminal sanctions. 18 U.S.C.
§ 2701(b) (1994).
404. Computer hacking, whereby computer users break into private computer sys-
tems, is a felony offense. 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (1994).
405. 36 F.3d 457 (5th Cir. 1994).
406. Id. at 461 (quoting the ECPA, 18 U.S.C. § 2510(17), defining "electronic
storage").
407. Id. at 463.
408. Big Mac or Big Brother? Voicemail monitoring suit against McDonald's raises
privacy issue, INFORMATIONWEEK, May 1, 1995, at 49.
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giant for $2 million in damages for emotional anguish, embarrassment,
and loss of income.4 °9
Huffcut claims that he had been assured that his voice mail access
code number and messages were private. According to Professor
Alan F. Westin of Columbia University, however, the ECPA "is
framed in terms of live conversations and digitized data like E-mail.
Voice mail seems to fall somewhere in between. '410 Professor Westin
claims that companies may have good reason to be concerned about
the "leaking of trade secrets, the quality of customer service, or even
urgent messages from clients that could be sitting in the voice mailbox
of an employee on sick leave."41'
G. Possible Legislation
In recent years, Congress has considered various information pri-
vacy bills. At the close of the 103d Congress, a few bills were still
pending. At the early stages of the 104th Congress, they had not yet
been reintroduced. Below is a summary of a few of the bills.
1. Privacy in the Workplace 412
The Privacy Workers and Consumers Act413 would provide privacy
protections in the workplace. This bill, which was introduced by Sena-
tor Paul Simon (D-Ill.) and Representative Pat Williams (D-Mont.) in
1994, would require employers to notify employees about how and
when they are being monitored at work and grant them access to their
files.
Privacy advocates believe such a law is long overdue. One organi-
zation, the 9-5 National Association of Working Women, reported
that approximately fifty million people use computers and telephones
at work on a daily basis.414 Roughly half of these workers are moni-
tored by their supervisors.41 5 An informal survey of major Silicon
Valley companies revealed that a majority retained the right to moni-
tor employees' e-mail.416 Some surveyed companies had no policy,
409. Rick Raber, Companies Have Wide Latitude to Spy on Employees, as Th'o
Lovers Find Out, Buff. News, Apr. 24, 1995, at Dll.
410. Id.
411. Id.
412. The ECPA, which updated wiretapping laws and outlawed e-mail interception
on public electronic networks, was silent on the issue of workplace monitoring.
413. S. 984, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (introduced by Sen. Paul Simon); H.R.
1900, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (introduced by Rep. Pat Williams).
414. Workers, Bosses Clash on Privacy, Chi. Trib., Oct. 9, 1994, (Business), at 8.
415. Id.
416. Miranda Ewell, E-Mail: Is the Boss Peeking?, San Jose Mercury News, Apr.
18, 1994, at 1A. According to a 1993 survey for Macworld, 15% of the nation's com-
panies monitor employees' performance by listening to voice mail. Why Tap Voice
Mail?, USA Today, Mar. 3, 1995, at 8A. In the same survey, other forms of workplace
monitoring are more prevalent, such as e-mail (42%) and reading computer files
(74%). IL
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but no company said that it would not review their employees' e-
mail.4 17 Company executives often argue that, since they own the
equipment, they should be able to monitor how it is being used.
2. Privacy of Medical Records
At the federal level, current laws governing medical data apply to
information that is collected and managed by government agencies,
not private businesses.41 8 In 1994, Representative Gary Condit (D-
Cal.) sponsored the Fair Health Information Practices Act,4 19 which
would ensure confidentiality of computerized medical records.4 20
More than eighty percent of medical records, however, are on pa-
per.421 The bill would apply to everyone in the industry, including
health care providers, researchers, public health officials, and others
who require access to health data.42 The current law only protects
medical data in the hands of a physician, and may not protect informa-
tion once it is transferred to an insurance company. The Condit bill
would close this major gap in the law. The measure would also estab-
lish a uniform federal privacy standard and impose civil and criminal
penalties upon those who improperly use patient data.4z
Most recently, hearings have been conducted in the Senate on a bill
known as the Medical Records Confidentiality Act of 1995.424 The
purpose of the bill is to provide increased control over one's own
medical records with an emphasis on "confidentiality, access, and se-
curity." 425 Further, the bill would "provide the health care system
There have only been a handful of e-mail cases. See supra part HF.3. Experts pre-
dict that the number will rise, however, because polls indicate that people are growing
more and more concerned about their e-mail privacy. Last year, in one closely
watched case, Hill v. NCAA, 865 P.2d 633 (CaL 1994), the California Supreme Court
ruled that state constitution provisions on privacy protect intrusions not only by gov-
ernment, but by business and other private parties. Id. at 644. Intrusions by a private
party would not violate an individual right to privacy, however, if they were justified
by "legitimate and important competing interests." Id. at 656. Thus, the California
high court ruled that the National Collegiate Athletic Association had the right to
monitor drug testing of Stanford athletes by observing urination. Id. at 669. Privacy
advocates fear that this case may have a negative impact on e-mail litigation in the
future.
417. Ewell, supra note 416, at 1A.
418. The Privacy Act of 1974 requires federal agencies to obtain written consent
from people before releasing personal information and permits people to inspect and
amend their files. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b), (d) (1994).
419. -IR. 4077, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994). This bill was reintroduced in the 104th
Congress. See 141 Cong. Rec. E63 (Jan. 9, 1995).
420. ld.
421. 141 Cong. Rec. S15577 (Oct. 24, 1995) (statement of Sen. Bennett).
422. Id. (statement of Sen. Bennett).
423. Id. (statement of Sen. Bennett).
424. S. 1360, 104th Cong., 1st Sess (1995).
425. 141 Cong. Rec. S15577 (Oct. 24, 1995) (statement of Sen. Bennett).
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with a Federal standard for handling identifiable health
information., 426
The bill would allow patients to restrict disclosure of medical data
for other than treatment and billing purposes. 427 Moreover, health
care providers would be required to maintain records of their disclo-
sures.428  Finally, the bill provides for both criminal and civil
remedies.429
The bill has gained broad bipartisan support.4 30 Some civil libertari-
ans, however, have attacked the bill,4 31 arguing that it would have the
opposite effect of its stated purpose.432 They believe that, as a result
of the bill, large companies would have the ability to compile medical
databases.433 Despite the negative feelings that some people have to-
ward the bill, Senator Bennett, the bill's cosponsor, stated that "[t]he
prospects [for the bill's passage by this Congress] are extremely
good.
4 34
3. Consumer Credit Privacy
The Consumer Reporting Reform Act,435 which was passed by the
House in 1994, was awaiting Senate approval in the last Congress.
The purpose of this measure, which was sponsored by Esteban Torres
(D-Cal.), is to improve the accuracy of consumer reporting and to pro-
tect the privacy of consumers. Among other things, this bill would
give consumers quicker and cheaper access to their credit files, and
allow them the opportunity to opt out of having their name and per-
sonal data used for marketing purposes. This law would amend the
FCRA.
III. THE NEED FOR SECURITY
With the growing dependence on computers, there has also been a
growing need for security measures through encryption. Personal and
sensitive information online, including tax returns, medical records,
welfare information, government bids, corporate trade secrets, credit
card and bank data, and intimate conversations over wireless tele-
426. Id. (statement of Sen. Bennett).
427. Id. The bill would also permit patients to inspect and correct inaccuracies in
their medical records, like they may do with their credit records. Gina Kolata, When
Patients' Records Are Commodities for Sale, N.Y. Tunes, Nov. 15, 1995, at C14.
428. Id.
429. Id. at S15578-79.
430. Kolata, supra note 427, at Al.
431. Id.; Beverly Woodward, Patients' Privacy at Risk, N.Y. Tmes, Nov. 15, 1995, at
A23.
432. See Kolata, supra note 427, at Al; A Good Start Toward Medical Privacy, N.Y.
Tunes, Nov. 20, 1995, at A14.
433. Id.
434. Id.
435. H.R. 1015, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994); S. 783, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994).
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phones, such as those that embarrassed the Prince of Wales,4 ' can be
intercepted. Even the National Football League is trying encrypted
radio messages for last minute communications between coaches and
players.437 Encryption, however, has one major drawback-it pro-
tects law-abiding citizens, criminals, and spies alike. Thus, it has be-
come increasingly urgent to find the proper balance between national
security and individual privacy.
Cryptography-the technique of scrambling a message so that it
can only be deciphered by the intended recipient, who knows the
code-has been in existence for millennia. Julius Caesar is reported
to have communicated in a secret code, replacing each letter by the
third later letter in the Latin alphabet. 38 Until recently, cryptography
has remained largely the domain of the military and diplomatic corps.
In the computer age, however, cryptography has become essential in
safeguarding the privacy of individual and corporate users of the in-
formation superhighway.
The Clipper Chip ("Clipper"), officially known as the "Key Escrow
Encryption Program," is an encryption technology developed jointly
by the National Institute of Standards and Technology ("NIST") and
the National Security Agency ("NSA"), the federal organization
charged with monitoring communications around the world. This tiny
silicon chip was designed to enable the government to intercept coded
telephone and computer communications. Clipper's cryptosystem is
based on a highly classified mathematical algorithm, Skipjack, which
scrambles data and voice transmission.
Each individual chip has a unique serial number and a "backdoor"
that can only be opened by two electronic "keys," which themselves
are algorithms. To prevent the government from potential abuse,
these "keys" must be placed "in escrow" in separate data bases at the
Treasury and NIST, and made available to law enforcement investiga-
tors only by court order.43 9 According to the FBI, the Clipper Chip is
sixteen million times stronger than its predecessor, Data Encryption
Standard ("DES").' 0
436. An intimate conversation allegedly between Prince Charles and Camilla
Parker Bowles, which took place on a cellular telephone, was intercepted. A tran-
script of the six minute tape was published by an Australian magazine, a German
tabloid, and excerpted in the British tabloids. William Tuohy, 'Camillagate' May Keep
Charles Off Throne, L.A. Tunes, Ian. 14, 1993, at A14.
437. Steven Levy, Battle of the Clipper Chip, N.Y. Tunes, June 12, 1994, § 6 (Maga-
zine), at 44, 50.
438. See Mark I. Koffsky, Comment, Choppy Waters in the Surveillance Data
Strean: The Clipper Scheme and the Particularity Clause, 9 High Tech. LI. 131, 133
(1994); Levy, supra note 437, at 47.
439. This is similar to the process currently used to grant law enforcement agencies
permission to tap ordinary analog phone calls.
440. Dan Lehrer, Clipper Chips and Cypherpunks, The Nation, Oct. 10, 1994, at
376, 378.
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Last May, the government adopted the Digital Signature Standard
("DSS"), an authentication code technology developed by NIST,
which allows users to sign documents electronically and verify that
they have not been altered. A more advanced version, Capstone,
which incorporates DSS, can handle not only telephone communica-
tions, but also computer data transfers and data technology. In April
1993, President Clinton asked NIST to consider the Clipper Chip as a
government standard, hoping that the key escrow system would bal-
ance two seemingly irreconcilable interests-privacy and security.
During the period for public comment, the Administration received
331 letters and reports: 329 opposed (several from industry groups
with many members) and only two in favor."'
One opponent, the ACLU, expressed its objections to policy initia-
tives that increase the government's ability to monitor activities of in-
dividuals and erode the protections guaranteed by the First, Fourth,
and Fifth Amendments." 2 For example, the key escrow system would
enable the government "to seize an encrypted communication and to
search and seize the key to such communication" prior to establishing
probable cause." 3 Moreover, the ACLU questioned the legality of a
policy that regulates speech encoded in the form of a computer disk in
the same fashion as weapons hardware. 44 4 The current export con-
trols policy categorizes many encryption products as "munitions-re-
lated," thereby requiring a special export license.445 In other words,
one may export a book, but not a computer disk containing the same
information, in an encrypted form." 6
The White House formally adopted Clipper on February 4, 1994,
amidst a swirl of public debate. Within a month, an anti-Clipper peti-
tion, circulated on the Internet by the Computer Professionals for So-
441. John Schwartz & John Mintz, Clinton Plan for Wiretaps Taps Fears, Wash.
Post, Apr. 4, 1994, (Financial), at 17, 22.
442. Letter from Kate Martin, Center for National Security Studies, & Janlori
Goldman, ACLU, to Computer Systems Security and Privacy Advisory Board 1 (May
28, 1993) [hereinafter ACLU Letter].
443. Id. at 4.
444. Id.
445. See, e.g., Lance J. Hoffman et al., Institute for Computer and Telecommunica-
tions Systems Policy, Cryptography: Trends in Technology and Policy 9 (1994).
446. This oddity in the law was recently tested by Matthew Blaze, a researcher at
AT&T who discovered a basic flaw in Clipper technology. See infra text accompany-
ing note 464. Blaze applied for and received a temporary export license to bring a
portable telephone encryption product with him on a business trip to Europe. Peter
H. Lewis, Between a Hacker and a Hard Place, N.Y. Times, Apr. 10, 1995, at D1.
Despite his having a license to export the device, Federal Customs agents at Kennedy
International Airport in New York detained him for more than an hour while they
puzzled over the "munitions" device, which they assumed to be a fancy weapon, in his
carry-on bag. Id. "[I]t just isn't possible for an individual traveler to follow all the
rules," concluded Blaze after the experience. Id. at D6. His days exporting arms were
over, he added, at least until the laws are changed. "[N]ext time, I'm just not going to
take it with me." Il
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cial Responsibility ("CPSR"), had collected 47,000 electronic
signatures. Illinois Congressman John Anderson announced that he
would serve on the advisory board of the Electronic Privacy Informa-
tion Center ("EPIC"), a Washington-based group formed to pressure
President Clinton to drop the Clipper proposal.
Senator Patrick J. Leahy, a Vermont Democrat who participated in
a subcommittee debating the issue, expressed serious doubts "whether
law-abiding users will want the government to hold the key to eaves-
dropping before any wiretap order is issued."" 7 Concerned about
America losing its competitive edge in the high-tech arena, Senator
Leahy warned that "[t]he information superhighway would become a
dead end at our border."" 8
The Clipper debate, dubbed the "Bosnia of telecommunications,"" 9
has only intensified in recent months. The Clipper Chip has a broad
spectrum of opponents, including civil liberties advocates, computer
industry executives, cypherpunks, and Christian fundamentalists.
The most pressing issue is the government's export restriction of
encryptions, other than Clipper. Privacy advocates insist that Clipper
would impede the development of secure communications and have
no effect on criminals who are too smart to use a device that the gov-
ernment can tap. After all, asked Daniel J. Weitzner, Deputy Direc-
tor of the Center for Democracy and Technology, "if someone is
planning a serious criminal conspiracy.., the likelihood that they are
going to go down to Radio Shack and buy the modem or buy the
telephone that has stamped on it 'approved by the NSA' is very
slim."450 In addition, John Perry Barlow, a co-founder of the EFF, 51
a civil liberties lobbying group concerned with data network issues,
stated: "Trusting the government with your privacy is like having a
peeping Tom install your window blinds."45
The global market for strong encryption products has been growing
steadily, and is potentially worth millions, if not billions, of dollars.
Computer and software companies, such as Apple, IBM, and
Microsoft lose tens of millions of dollars each year in potential export
sales to foreign competitors. William Whitehurst, IBM Director of
Data Security Systems, admitted that "[t]here's some definite uneven-
447. Patrick Leahy, The Clipper Chip Solution, Roll Call, June 27, 1994, at 12.
448. Id.
449. Levy, supra note 437, at 51 (quoting White House technology official Michael
R. Nelson).
450. Association of the Bar of the City of New York, Panel Discussion on the Clip-
per Chip 13 (Jan. 19, 1995) (statement of Daniel J. Weitzner, Deputy Director, Center
for Democracy and Technology) (on file with the Fordham Law Review) [hereinafter
Policy Debate Transcript].
451. See supra part I.B. (listing EFFs comments to the Information Infrastructure
Task Force Privacy Working Group Principles).
452. Jeff Rose, Right to E-mail Privacy Would Seem Self-evident, San Diego Union
Trib., Mar. 1, 1994, (Computerlink), at 3.
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ness in the implementation of export controls. '453 He continued, stat-
ing that "users would like freedom of choice ... to protect their very
valuable information., 454
While installation of Clipper Chip is a "voluntary" industry stan-
dard,455 the government's enormous buying power would make it es-
sentially a de facto industry standard. 6 To facilitate sales of Clipper
abroad, the State Department relaxed its export controls over Clipper
while continuing to restrict other encryption methods. 457 That makes
it difficult for commercial encryption systems to compete. And while
Clipper is voluntary now, there is concern that if this system were ever
to become mandatory, it could function like Prohibition on alcohol in
the 1920s, encouraging black market activities and contempt for the
law.
On the other hand, Clipper's defenders, who are largely in the gov-
ernment, believe that Clipper is the best option available to defend
the nation against crime, terrorism, and external threats. The NSA
claims that it must be able to decrypt any communication in the world
453. Policy Debate Transcript, supra note 450, at 23.
454. Id.
455. "Government officials say that even though Clipper has been endorsed as a
new standard, everyone, including Government agencies, may use other encryption
systems [domestically] in place of or in addition to it." Peter H. Lewis, Of Privacy and
Security: The Clipper Chip Debate, N.Y. Times, Apr. 24, 1994, at 5; see also Koffsky,
supra note 438, at 133-36 (noting that the use of the Clipper Chip is non-optional and
positing a late extension to mandatory use). There are governmental restrictions,
however, on the exportation of competing strong encryption systems. Lewis, supra, at
5.
456. See ACLU Letter, supra note 442, at 2; Letter from Computer Professionals
for Social Responsibility to President Clinton 1 (Jan. 24, 1994) (on file with the Ford-
ham Law Review) [hereinafter CPSR Letter].
457. For example, a state-of-the-art program called PGP (which stands for Pretty
Good Privacy) was designed by Philip Zimmermann, a 41-year-old software wizard/
activist based in Colorado. Wifiam M. Bulkeley, Popularity Overseas of Encryption
Code Has the U.S. Worried, Wall St. J., Apr. 28, 1994, at A3. Whether it is more
powerful than Clipper is unknown, because the Skipjack algorithm behind Clipper is
classified. PGP, however, can also be used on top of Clipper.
Several years ago, a friend of Zimmerman's published the program on the Internet.
Id. It quickly spread to many users in the United States and Europe. Id. One elec-
tronic message to Zimmerman from Latvia read, "If dictatorship takes over Russia,
... your PGP is widespread from Baltic to Far East now and will help democratic
people if necessary. Thanks." Id. at A3 (quoting the electronic message).
So far, PGP is uncrackable. In 1993, U.S. Customs Service agents questioned Zim-
merman about his program being exported abroad without an export license. Id. at 8.
Last spring, Zimmerman learned that he was targeted for grand jury investigation. Id.
at 3. This raises interesting legal issues. For example, is it a crime to disseminate
information legally in the United States that falls under the "munitions" category,
thus requiring an export license, but which is accessible to network users worldwide?
Is the First Amendment freedom of speech threatened by prohibiting overseas dis-
semination of information stored on a software disk?
Unfortunately, there is also a dark side to PGP: In 1993, it blocked the Sacramento
police from reading the computer diary of a convicted pedophile and linking him to a
suspected child-pornography ring. Id. at A3; Lehrer, supra note 440, at 376.
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in order to protect the personal safety and national security of its citi-
zens. NSA official Michael R. Nelson explained, "We are trying to
keep this technology out of the hands of Moammar Khaddafi or the
Hezbolah terrorist gangs in Lebanon .... We don't want this every-
where.... [W]e can insure that overseas this technology does not
appear in every telephone in Libya."4 58
The FBI argues that traditional wiretap techniques, which entail lit-
tle more than splicing into a telephone line and listening, are insuffi-
cient to protect society from modem criminals, especially terrorists.4 9
One high-level FBI official stated that the damage resulting from the
World Trade Center bombing is estimated at approximately $5 bil-
lion.460 The NSA's former General Counsel Stewart A. Baker, stated
that the only proposed alternative to government control of encryp-
tion is to allow access to everyone, including criminals.461 He suggests
that the choice is simple: "Would you rather trust this to the market-
place ... or are you prepared to trust the democratic institutions...
that have worked for our country... over the years?" 4' 6
American consumers are wary of purchasing an encryption program
set up by the government. Further, industry officials fear that the
Clipper's electronic "backdoor," which is an entry for legal wiretap-
ping, would enable the government or unscrupulous civilians to eaves-
drop without procuring a court order to obtain the "keys" held in
escrow.463 Moreover, last spring, a computer scientist at AT&T Bell
Laboratories discovered a basic flaw in the Clipper technology that
permits computer-savvy lawbreakers to encode messages that the gov-
ernment cannot crack.464
Last July, the Clinton Administration retreated from its encryption
policy when it stated that the policy would apply to telephone conver-
sations, but not to computers or other electronic communications.
Vice President Al Gore announced this change in government policy
in a letter addressed to former Representative Maria Cantwell (D-
458. Policy Debate Transcript, supra note 450, at 21 (comment of Michael R. Nel-
son, Special Assistant for Information Technology, White House Office of Science
and Technology Policy).
459. Policy Debate Transcript, supra note 450, at 7 (comment by James Kallstrom,
FBI Special Agent in Charge of Special Operations Division in the New York Office).
460. Id.
461. Policy Debate Transcript, supra note 450, at 12 (comment by Stewart A.
Baker, partner at Steptoe & Johnson and former General Counsel of the NSA).
462. Id.
463. John Markoff, Flaw Discovered in Federal Plan for Wiretapping, N.Y. Times,
June 2, 1994, at Al, D17.
464. Id. at Al.
465. See Elizabeth Corcoran & John Mintz, Administration Steps Back on Com-
puter Surveillance.: 'Clipper Chip' Use to be Limited to Phones, Wash. Post, July 21,
1994, at Al, A10; Washington Drops Spy Chip Plan, Fin. Times (London), July 22,
1994, at 3 (discussing a letter from Vice President Al Gore to Maria Cantwell).
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Wash.),4 66 a one-term Congresswoman and Clipper foe who had nego-
tiated directly with Gore regarding the policy.467 Gore said that the
administration would study the economic effect of export controls on
encryption. 68 Gore's letter outlined "a framework for future negotia-
tions on ... how both to secure data transmissions and guarantee
government access to them. '4 69 The new encoding standard "would
be voluntary and would be exportable."470 Last August, a group of
hardware manufacturers sent a letter to Gore urging administrative
action to liberalize export controls on equipment containing encryp-
tion technology other than Clipper. The software industry quickly fol-
lowed suit, sending a letter on the Business Software Alliance's
letterhead signed by Bill Gates of Microsoft, Jim Manzi formerly of
Lotus and IBM, and others.47' The letter requested "immediate ac-
tion to liberalize export controls" to permit the inclusion of DES-level
encryption in generally available software programs "so that... [they
could] at least maintain [their] international position. '472
Some critics, such as former EFF Executive Director Jerry Berman,
see this change in policy as a "big step, both for privacy and secur-ity."'473 Others believe the government is just buying time. One policy
analyst from EPIC, David Banisar, said that nothing has changed.
"Clipper is the tip of the iceberg .... It's part of a big push by law
enforcement to have their fingers in a lot of pies."474 Further, it is not
clear that the Administration has really made any concessions-most
computers and faxes travel over telephone lines and switches. Thus,
the Clipper debate continues.
466. Washington Drops Spy Chip Plan, supra note 465, at 3. Cantwell's district is
the home of the software giant Microsoft, which is vehemently opposed to the Clipper
Chip. l
467. Corcoran & Mintz, supra note 465, at Al.
468. Id. at A10.
469. Id. at Al.
470. Id.
471. Ted Bunker, Government Ban on Scramblers Leaves U.S. Firms Out in the
Cold, Investor's Bus. Daily, Aug. 16, 1995, at A3.
472. Id.
473. Corcoran & Mintz, supra note 465, at Al. Although the administration has
tried to create a de facto market for Clipper by encouraging federal agencies and the
private sector to use it, Berman stated that "the fact is, there is no market for it."
Gore Letter on Clipper Chip Prompts Debate Over Interpretation, Common Carrier
Wk., July 25, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File.
474. Michael L. Rozansky, Taking a Byte Out of Crime; Clipper Chip Stirs Protest
Over Eavesdropping, Houston Chron., July 31, 1994, (Business), at 2. Banisar con-
tends that the NSA has too much influence and financial control over NIST and urges
Congressional oversight of NSA. David Banisar, Roadblocks on the Information Su-
perhighway, 41 Fed. B. News & J. 495, 502 (1994). Marc Rotenberg, director of
EPIC, said the letter was a good first step, but did not resolve the security issues of
encrypted messages. John Markoff, Gore Shifts Stance on Chip Code, N.Y. Tunes, July
21, 1994, at D1, D7. He declared that "[w]e cannot accept the key-escrow require-
ment," and stated that the inherent risks to privacy are "enormous." Id.
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CONCLUSION
The information superhighway has been aptly termed the "Wild
West," because it is an uncharted, open territory. Many privacy con-
cerns are new; others are the same, but the contexts in which the con-
cerns arise are different. The collection, storage, and dissemination of
data are easier and cheaper than ever before. There are tremendous
advantages to having such a vast array of information available. In-
deed, "it is a basic tenet of our political and economic systems that
more knowledge makes for better decisionmaking. 475
American society is "at least ambivalent about the weight to assign
to interests in personal privacy when they compete with the value of
truthfulness."'4 7 6 The benefits derived from the flow of information
should be weighed against the loss of control over security and indi-
vidual privacy. Surely one of the greatest challenges ahead will be
finding the proper balance.
475. Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss & David W. Leebron, Foreworub Privacy and In-
formation Technology, 1986 Ann. Surv. Am. L 495, 496.
476. Diane L. Zimmerman, Requiem for a Heavyweight: A Farewell to Warren and
Brandeis's Privacy Tort, 68 Cornell L. Rev. 291, 326 (1983).
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